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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs.-
LEO J. NUTTALL, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 10189 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was convicted of obtaining a chose in ac-
tion by false pretenses in violation of 76-20-8, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, in the First Judicial District Court, Cache 
County, and appeals from the conviction. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was tried on April 9, 1964, on the crime 
charged by jury trial, the Honorable Lewis H. Jones, Judge, 
presiding, and was found guilty and judgment was entered 
thereon on the 27th day of April, 1964. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the judgment of 
the trial court should be affirmed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent submits the following statement of facts. 
On or about the 25th day of October, 1962, the appel-
lant, Leo J. Nuttall, approached Richard B. Gittens, a 
service station owner in Cache County with whom he had 
prior acquaintance ( T. 9) . Nuttall advised Gittens and 
other persons who were present that he knew of a means by 
which they could make some money without any invest-
ment. He would sell Gittens a tractor and Gittens would 
lease the tractor back to him and he in turn would lease the 
tractor to third persons ( T. 11 ) . No money or any invest-
ment would have to be made by Gittens, nor would he have 
to make a payment (T. 11). After a period of time, Gittens 
was lead to believe he could have $300 or a used tractor 
(T. 11). Gittens was advised that Nuttall had one tractor 
left to use in the transaction ( T. 12) . It was understood 
that the payments to be made on the tractor would be made 
from monies derived by Gittens leasing the tractor back to 
Nuttall who in tum would re-lease to other persons. Gittens 
was not advised that his contract to purchase the tractor 
would be discounted for finance purposes or that a finance 
company was to be involved. He was merely advised that 
he need not put up any money, but that in three years he 
could receive either money or a used tractor (T. 15, 16). 
As a consequence of Nuttall's representation, Gittens exe-
cuted plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 2 and 3. Exhibit 2 is a condi-
tional sales contract whereby Gittens would buy from Leo 
J. Nuttall d b a Universal Equipment Company, a used 
Ford tractor and blade. Exhibit 1 was an equipment lease 
of the same Ford tractor from Gittens back to Universal 
Equipment Rentals. The lease was to be for 60 months for 
a total of $1650 to be paid at $27.50 per month. Subsequent 
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to signing the contract, Gittens heard nothing further. 
Thereafter, approximately a year or so later, he received 
delinquent notices from Pacific Finance Company of Logan 
informing him that payments were due to them under the 
contract and lease. The evidence disclosed that Mr. Gene 
Bronson, the manager of Pacific Finance Company, was 
approached by Mr. Nuttall relative to discounting Mr. 
Gittens contract and other contracts which were of the 
same order which he had received from other persons (T. 
45-48). Mr. Bronson gave him a $550 loan on the contract 
and made a check payable to Leo Nuttall of Universal 
Equipment Company. The evidence at trial disclosed that 
Mr. Nuttall had made generally the same representations 
concerning a tractor lease and purchase agreement to vari-
ous other persons as well as Mr. Gittens. These persons had 
also entered into contracts with Mr. Nuttall (Exhibits 5-
16) on generally the same terms and had the same experi-
ence. Mr. Nuttall has also discounted these contracts with 
Mr. Bronson (T. 55-58, 43-48). Subsequent to Mr. Gittens 
being informed that he had to make payments to Pacific 
Finance Company, he and several other persons confronted 
Mr. Nuttall who, in their presence, admitted that there 
were "no tractors" (T. 13, 26, 62). The tractor which was 
allegedly sold by Mr. Nuttall to Mr. Gittens bore Serial No. 
378432. A tractor with that serial number was present at 
trial but various experts testified that the serial number 
appeared to be not the original number on the tractor but 
had been stamped over after having been ground down 
(T. 82, 77, 17). Further no company by the name of Uni-
versal Equipment Rentals of Salt Lake City could be lo-
cated (T. 64). The evidence at trial further disclosed that 
Mr. Gittens had not as yet had to pay any money to anyone 
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on account of the transaction. Based upon the above evi-
dence, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SHOW THAT THE 
APPELLANT DID IN FACT COMMIT A FRAUD. 
The appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient 
to prove the crime charged. It is submitted that the evi-
dence is overwhelming to prove each of the elements essen-
tial to the crime. It appears that at the time Gittens was 
induced to sign the contract of purchase and then tum over 
the contract of purchase to the appellant, representations 
were made that he would be buying a tractor which the 
appellant presently had. The tractor would then be leased 
back to the appellant or his company and he would in tum 
re-lease to a third person and the income from the latter 
lease would pay the contract payments on the tractor pur-
chased. It appears that there was no such company in 
existence as Universal Equipment Rentals of Salt Lake City 
(T. 64). Further, there never were any tractors, thus the 
representation that Leo Nuttall made that he had one trac-
tor left which would be the subject of the sale and resulting 
leaseback was a false representation of a present material 
fact. As a consequence of the repr~sentations, Gittens was 
induced to sign the contract and parted with the contract, 
turning it over to Nuttall for the purposes of the transac-
tion. Nuttall in turn used the contract to obtain money from 
Pacific Finance Company, a transaction which had not 
been contemplated by the parties. Additionally, it should 
be noted that Nuttall made the same representation to vari-
ous other people, going through the same scheme, which 
demonstrates that he had a design to obtain money when 
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he knew that his representations were false. Further, he 
made the same admission, that there were never any trac-
tors, in front of several witnesses. It is clear that these facts 
evidence the crime of obtaining a chose in action by false 
pretenses. The crime of obtaining chose in action by false 
pretenses is merely an extension of the common law crime 
of obtaining money or property by false pretenses. Clark 
and Marshall, Crimes, 6th Ed., section 1223. Thus 76-20-8, 
Utah Code Annotated 1953, groups the crimes of obtaining 
money, goods, wares, chases of action, or chattels, by false 
pretenses all under one heading. The same elements are 
essential to the crime, only the object is different. 
In State v. Howd, 55 U. 527, 188 P. 628 ( 1920), this 
court acknowledged that under the provisions of 103-18-8, 
Revised Statutes 1933, which is the same statute as pres-
ently designated 76-20-8, UCA, 1953, that there must be: 
1. An intent to cheat or defraud, 
2. An actual fraud committed, 
3. A fraudulent representation for the purpose of per-
petrating a fraud, and 
4. That the fraudulent representation induced the 
person to part with his property. 
In this instance, the evidence fully discloses that each of 
these elements was met. The intent to cheat and defraud 
is apparent from the facts themselves, i.e. the absence of any 
tractor, the discounting of the contract with the finance 
company where such act was not indicated as being con-
templated at the time the contract was entered into, and 
the numerous instances in which the same scheme was em-
ployed. That an actual fraud was committed is apparent 
from the fact that Gittens was induced to enter into the 
contract and transfer the same to the appellant on the basis 
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that there was a present tractor in existence and actually 
no tractor was in existence, nor was the program as out-
lined capable of being performed. There was a fraudulent 
representation as to the existence not only of the tractor, 
but apparently as to the status of Mr. Nuttall's business 
since it does not appear of record that there was any such 
business leasing tractors as Mr. Nuttall represented. Finally, 
the fraudulent and false representations of the appellant 
caused the victim to part with his chose in action. The ap-
pellant confuses the fact that Gittens has not sustained any 
monetary loss as yet with whether he has in fact sustained 
a loss. When he parted with his contract, he parted with 
what purported to be a binding legal obligation capable of 
rendering him from benefit. A chose in action is merely an 
intangible opportunity to have the substance of a chose be-
come a reality. By parting with the chose in action, the 
fraud was complete and Gittens had parted with his rights 
under the contract and with his expected return. Choses in 
action have various values. This is evidenced in this case by 
the fact that the contract and leasing agreement were suffi-
ciently valuable that a finance company was willing to pay 
$550 for the agreement. Mr. Gittens lost the value of that 
chose in action when he gave it over to Mr. Nuttall; and 
where the fraud of Nuttall set up and executed the whole 
scheme, Gittens lost a valuable expectancy. Further, 
whether Gittens may or may not ultimately be called upon 
to respond is immaterial to the issues of the case. The crime 
charged was not obtaining money by false pretenses, but 
was complete when Gittens parted with the contract and 
rental agreement. 
The doctrine of the H owd case has been followed in vari-
ous subsequent cases. In State v. Timmerman, 88 U. 481, 
55 P.2d 1320 ( 1936), the elements expressed in the Howd 
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case were expanded to some extent. Essentially, however, 
the requirements of a fraudulent representation knowingly 
made with the purpose of defrauding a person and obtain-
ing something of value were still required. Further, it was 
recognized that the party must part with something of 
value in reliance upon the false and fraudulent representa-
tion. There is no question but what the execution of a chose 
in action is something of value. It may be valuable to each 
party to a chose in action, which is in the form of a contract. 
It has a readily identifiable market value. A value, there-
fore, can be placed on a contract and it is, therefore, obvious 
that the victim in this case parted with something of value. 
In Balline v. The District Court, 107 U. 247, 152 P.2d 
265 ( 1945), this court recognized that fraud by silence may 
occur where the circumstances require an honest disclosure 
and that fraud may occur when there is a material misrep-
resentation of a fact which had the victim known of the 
truth of the matter, he would not have parted with his 
money, property, or chose in action. In that case, this court 
affirmed a conviction where the misrepresentation was as 
to encumbrances against an automobile and where the cir-
cumstances involved a failure to disclose the status of the 
title, coupled with such representations as would lead a 
person to believe he was receiving a vehicle free of any 
impediments to clear title. The facts, although in a dif-
ferent setting, are not unlike those in the present case. This 
court found the fraud to be sufficiently proved so as to allow 
the conviction to be sustained. See also State v. C-obb, 13 
U.2d 376, 374 P.2d 845 ( 1962). The scheme in the Cobb 
case bears some resemblance to the scheme in the instant 
case although it involved a credit card situation. This court 
observed as to the contention that the evidence was insuffi-
cient that "We can answer only that there appears to have 
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been too much to convict." As a consequence, there is no 
merit to the appellant's position that a fraud was not shown. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ALLOWING OTHER 
WITNESSES TO TESTIFY CONCERNING SIMILAR DEAL-
INGS WITH THE APPELLANT. 
During the course of the trial, after the victim identified 
in the information, Mr. Richard Gittens, had testified, the 
court allowed other witnesses who had been the victims of 
the same scheme to testify. Mr. Gittens was the first witness 
and testified as to the execution of Exhibits 1 and 2, the rep-
resentation made that a tractor was in existence, and as to 
the contemplated course of dealing between Mr. Gittens 
and the appellant. He further testified as to receiving no-
tices from the finance company as to the necessity of making 
contract payments where at the time of the agreement it 
was not contemplated that the parties would be involved 
with a finance company. Further, Mr. Gittens testified that 
as to the tractor which was present at the time of trial that 
the serial number which it had did not appear to be its true 
serial number. All of this evidence was sufficient to show a 
probability that a crime had been committed. Further, the 
appellant's admission that there had never been any trac-
tors was received in evidence through Mr. Gittens (T. 13). 
The appellant argues that there was not sufficient corpus 
delicti to prove the crime; therefore, it was improper to 
allow other witnesses to testify as to similar dealings. The 
appellant's argument is a non sequitur. The two concepts 
(corpus delicti and proof of other crimes) are not related 
and the appellant has confused legal propositions which are 
independent of each other. The rule as to corpus delicti is 
that a confession in and of itself will not support a convic-
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tion but it must be corroborated by other facts which show 
a probability that the crime charged has in fact been com-
mitted. In the absence of a corpus delicti, a confession may 
not be received. Further, in the absence of a corpus delicti, 
a crime has not been proved. However, the corpus delicti 
need not prove the guilt of the appellant beyond a reason-
able doubt, but need only show some evidence that a crime 
in fact had been committed. In the instant case, no confes-
sion as such was received into evidence. As a consequence, 
the corpus delicti rule is not stricti y raised. 
In State v. Ferry, 2 U.2d 371, 275 P.2d 173 ( 1954), it 
was stated: 
"In State v. Wells, 1909, 35 Utah 400, 100 P. 681, 
136 Am. St. Rep. 1059, 19 Ann. Cas. 631, we held the 
independent evidence must prove the corpus delicti 
beyond a reasonable doubt; in State v. Johnson, 1938, 
95 Utah 572, 83 P. 2d 1010, we softened that rule by 
saying such proof need not be conclusive; we ennunci-
ate the rule in our present decision, to clarify the mat-
ter, feeling that such rule, already announced in Ari-
zona in Burrows v. State, 8 Ariz. 99, 297 P. 1029, is the 
soundest of those heretofore enunciated by the authori-
ties. See also, State v. Crank, 1943" 105 Utah 332" 
142 P. 2d 178, 170 A.L.R. 542.'" 
The rule now in effect in this state is that the corrobora-
tion for corpus delicti need only be "independent, clear and 
convincing." State v. Ferry, supra; State v. Weldon, 6 U.2d 
372,314P.2d353 (1957). 
It is submitted that the evidence in the instant case, even 
apart from the admission of the appellant, is sufficient to 
show a probability that a crime was committed. Evidence 
of the false representations of the appellant, or at least the 
failure to disclose matters which at the time of contracting 
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would definitely mislead the victim, is evidenced by the fact 
that there was no Universal Equipment Rentals of Salt 
Lake City (T. 64). This, coupled with the presence of a 
finance company when none was contemplated and the 
failure of the agreement to assume the form which the par-
ties contemplated, was sufficient evidence to be added to the 
other evidence so as to prove the guilt of the appellant. 
Further, the employment of the same scheme in other in-
stances evidence the fraud and leads to the inference of a 
wrongful scheme. Therefore, it is apparent that the con-
cept of corpus delicti offers the appellant no basis for re-
versal. However, it does not appear that concept of corpus 
delicti is tied in with the concept of showing a scheme or 
design to defraud. Indeed, the evidence of other contracts 
under similar circumstances and the defalcations of those 
contracts tends to support a conclusion that the contractual 
situation which was the subject of the information was 
merely a part of a scheme. Thus, in State v. Tacconi, 110 
U. 212, 171 P.2d 388 ( 1946), this court recognized that it is 
permissible to show other acts of an accused which may evi-
dence guilty knowledge or show a scheme or design to per-
petrate a crime. McCormick Evidence ( 1954), page 328, 
notes that evidence of other crimes may be introduced "to 
prove the evidence of a larger continuing plan, scheme or 
conspiracy of which the present crime on trial is a part." 
It is, therefore, perfectly permissible to allow the other wit-
nesses to testify to demonstrate the full scheme or plan that 
was involved. See State v. Nemier, 106 U. 307, 148 P.2d 
327 ( 1944) ; State v. Scott, 111 U. 9, 175 P.2d 1016 ( 1947). 
In the Scott case, this court approved receipt into evidence 
of other crimes of the accused tending to show a connection 
with the confidence game. This court felt it was relevant to 
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show the full scheme and design and thus the criminality of 
the accused's involvement. See State v. Lyman, 10 U.2d 58, 
348 P.2d 340 ( 1960). There was, therefore, no impropriety 
on the part of the trial court in allowing the other witnesses 
to testify since the evidence was not relevant simply for the 
purpose of demonstrating the appellant's proclivity towards 
crime, but rather was directly related to the scheme and 
design involved in the commission of the instant crime and 
could form a part of the corpus delicti which would justify 
the receipt of any confession of the accused, and in this case 
the admission of the accused. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR IN AL-
LOWING EVIDENCE OF THE STATUS OF OTHER CON-
TRACTS WHICH WERE A PART OF THE APPELLANT'S 
SCHEME. 
As can be seen from Point II, the trial court was perfectly 
justified in receiving the testimony of similar fraudulent 
actions by the appellant in obtaining contracts from other 
persons. This evidence tended to show the criminal pur-
pose, scheme and design of the appellant's operation and as 
noted before was admissible and probative of the crimi-
nality charged under the information. Equally relevant 
was the status of the contracts. Whether payments were 
made or were not made would directly relate to whether 
there were tractors in existence which were being released 
by the appellant to provide income to pay off the contracts. 
The delinquency in the contracts would tend to support a 
conclusion that there was no leasing being carried on and 
thus that there were no tractors in existence. The trial court., 
therefore, acted properly in receiving such evidence. 
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POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY. 
The trial court instructed the jury orally on the elements 
of the crime and the law applicable to the case (T. 83). The 
Instructions covered the various elements and definitions of 
terms. The appellant contends that at one point in the 
court's instructions the Judge, in effect, commented on the 
evidence and thereby committed prejudicial error. The 
part which the appellant contends prejudiced him relates 
to the court's discussion on the requirement of an intent to 
defraud (T. 85). What the court stated which is deemed 
prejudicial is as follows : 
"* * * There must be an affirmative finding of a 
separate evil intent to defraud at the time the signature 
of Mr. Gittens was obtained on those papers. Now 
there are enough facts and circumstances here, if you 
accept the inferences and the theory of the state, to 
sustain that. But if you don't accept the inferences and 
all of the elements which counsel will discuss, then of 
course the state has failed to prove its case." 
Thereafter the trial court again reminded the jury of the 
rule of reasonable doubt and referred to his previous in-
structions on the issue. Subsequently, the court instructed 
on its intent, this time without commenting as to whether 
the facts were or were not sufficient. The court stated (T. 
86) : 
"We're talking about this intent. This jury must 
look into the mind of this defendant and resolve that 
question of whether he had this evil intent to ~ilk 
Gittens by either not buying the tractor or not mak1ng 
the payments at the time the contract was signed." 
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Finally, the jury was admonished again on the necessity of 
finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, was advised that 
they were at liberty to believe whom and what they would. 
The objectionable portion of the trial court's instruction 
may at first blush seem like a comment on the evidence. 
However, it is submitted that it in fact when read in the 
context with other instructions was no more than an inept 
means of setting out the alternative choices for the jury. It 
is recognized that in State v. Green, 78 U. 580, 6 P.2d 177 .. 
this court reversed a conviction where the trial court com-
mented during its instructions on the sufficiency of the evi-
dence. In that case, however, the comment was to the effect 
that the evidence was "uncontroverted" and thus left the 
jury no room within which to exercise their right to accept 
or reject the evidence. In the instant case, the instructions 
must be viewed as a whole and when so viewed, it is ap-
parent that the court's comment was no more than an in-
nocuous reference cured by the overall tenor of the instruc-
tions. The trial court instructed the jury that they were the 
sole judges of the evidence, instructed them on the necessity 
of finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, all subsequent 
to the offensive instruction, and again instructed the jury on 
the intent and did not use the same offensive language. It 
is submitted, therefore, that the facts of the insant case are 
not as aggravated as those in State v. Green, but rather fit 
in the category of remarks found to be nonprejudicial in 
State v. Kallas, 97 U. 492, 94 P.2d 414 and State v. Musser, 
110 U. 534, 175 P.2d 724. In the case of State v. Dixson, 
260 P. 138 (Mont. 1927), the defendant was convicted of 
the crime of first degree murder. The trial court in th~ 
presence of the jury stated, "I think there is evidence suffi-
cient to show that a crime has been committed." The Mon-
tana Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial court's 
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statement was improper, but found that it was nonprejudi-
cial in view of the curative instructions and other instruc-
tions of a nature that when the alleged offensive instruction 
is read in context with all of the instructions given, no preju-
dice could result. In 24A, C.J.S. Criminal Law, Section 
1901, it is observed: 
"An appellate court should be slow to reverse for 
misconduct of the trial court, unless it appears that the 
conduct complained of was intended or calculated to 
disparage accused in the eyes of the jury and to pre-
vent the jury from exercising an impartial judgment 
on the merits; and misconduct of a trial judge which 
will warrant a reversal should be so definite and ap-
parent as to leave little doubt that it resulted in depriv-
ing accused of a fair and impartial trial. Improper 
remarks of the trial judge, or his misconduct during 
the course of the trial, will not be ground for reversal 
where no prejudice resulted therefrom. 
"The test of prejudicial error, in this connection, is 
whether such a fixed impression was made on the 
minds of the jury as to influence the verdict and 
whether any admonition by the court had the effect 
of removing the harmful impression already made; 
and a conviction should not be reversed because of the 
action of the trial court unless the reviewing court can 
say, after review of the whole record, that the action 
of the trial court resulted in a miscarriage of justice 
and was so grossly improper that it denied accused a 
fair trial.***" 
This rule has in effect been codified by the Legislature in 
77-42-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, providing that the 
prejudicial error will not be presumed and that this court 
should not reverse a judgment unless it is satisfied that the 
substantial rights of a party have been affected. See also, 
State v. St. Clair, 5 U.2d 342,301 P.2d 752; State v. Lanoss, 
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63 U. 151, 223 P. 1065. It is submitted that in the instant 
case the posture of the evidence, the nature of the instruc-
tions and the relative insignificance of the alleged prejudi-
cial remark are such that no prejudice could have resulted 
to the appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
An analysis of the evidence in the instant case clearly 
shows that it was sufficient to prove the appellant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. He was afforded a full and fair 
trial by a jury who, after viewing the evidence, found the 
accused guilty. The alleged claims of prejudicial error 
afford no basis for relief and this court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted .. 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
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